Congress could, conceivably, fund only through November, conditioning further funding on Patraeus' promised early-October report on the results of the surge.

Or begin funding for only 6 months at a time.

It's too bad many have already declared defeat, voted no-confidence on Petraeus after OKing him to be the man, and now are refering to "ending the war" even though our running out the back door is hardly going to end anything.

We'll see what the compromise ends up being, but I think Dems have taken very simple polls and made themselves believe most Americans don't care how we get out, when it's a little more nuanced than that. People who have been paying attention know that Iraq is ripe for a REAL civil war, most likely wiping out the Sunnis unless other countries jump in, and then it's a regional war. Both bad possibilities.

http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/05/pet...s_vs_hagel.html

Petraeus vs. Hagel

Gen. David Petraeus recently returned from Iraq to brief the leaders of our government about the war there. Perhaps most notably, he took direct aim at the "Iraq is in a civil war" mantra of the media and Democratic leaders by stating that "80 percent to 90 percent of the suicide attacks" - the spectacular car bombings racking up the horrific fatalities - are carried out by foreign fighters who are al Qaeda members or affiliated with al Qaeda.

At nearly the same time, Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) sat down at an interview with Robert Novak for the Washington Post. The Senator just returning from another trip to Iraq brings bad news. He sides with Democrats in determining the war in Iraq is a losing effort against sectarian violence with US forces stuck in the middle. The Senator claims that al Qaeda is only responsible for "maybe 10 percent" of the violence. He says "Iraq is not embroiled in a terrorist war today." By contrast, General Petraeus says "Iraq is, in fact, the central front of al Qaeda's global campaign and we devote considerable resources to the fight against al Qaeda Iraq."

This condition of contrasting views is aggravated by the fact that the Senator is a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Which begs the question: where is Senator Hagel getting the military intelligence to form his opinion if not from the senior uniformed military commander of the war? Who is telling him that al Qaeda is not the central opponent or the leader of the anti-Iraqi forces? Did he derive his viewpoint from military briefings? Or does it come from other, more political, considerations?

The Senator doesn't say in his Novak interview. In fact, he presents almost no specific information to support his views. But we can evaluate the claims of both men based on free press and military reporting from Iraq.

American Forces Press Service (AFPS) reports that a senior al Qaeda leader who was closely associated with Usama bin Laden was recently transferred to Gitmo after being picked up some time late last year. He was captured while traveling to Iraq to direct the al Qaeda efforts there in late 2006. (He is also a former Iraqi army officer, a fact that fits nicely with the research that ties Saddam and al Qaeda together in my new eBook, Both In One Trench: Saddam's support to the global Islamic jihad movement and international terrorism.)

But perhaps six or seven months ago is not timely enough, and the Senator was talking about more recent developments. Did al Qaeda pack up and leave Iraq since then? Dated April 29th, 2007 AFPS reports that twenty one al Qaeda terrorists were taken into custody in actions against that terrorist network.

Our friends certainly think Iraq is a central front for al Qaeda. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer just responded to another horrific car bombing by stating,

"This is a deliberate attempt by al-Qaeda to incite sectarian violence in Iraq and it's very important that the international community understands what al-Qaeda's tactics are."

The Iraqi government seems to think al Qaeda is the chief opponent. It worries in this Reuters article that the political infighting in the US is being exploited by al Qaeda.

Even al Qaeda seems to think al Qaeda is responsible for the worst of the violence as evidenced by dozens of recent news article - such as this one from the AP, which is also notable because it refers to al Qaeda as an "insurgent group". Just search the phrase "al Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility" under Google News and you will find dozens of references to al Qaeda claiming responsibility for the worst attacks.

It would appear that our military, our allies, the Iraqi government and even al Qaeda itself believes that Iraq is the central front in the war against al Qaeda. At the other end of the spectrum is the Democratic leadership and Senator Chuck Hagel, oh yes, and certain media outlets, which insist we have set off a civil war with al Qaeda responsible for a minor share of violence.

Given the opportunity the Senator has had to influence the review of prewar intelligence, it is more than a little disconcerting that he has ignored our own military intelligence, allies and the admission of the enemy, in determining his stance.

That ain't gonna do much for refitting, refurbishing, and resupplying the NG and RA that needs to be started on now due to lead time longer than 6 months to a year.

I'm afraid I'd have to go with the conventional wisdom on this. Al Quaeda in Iraq has been largely a minimal and irrelevant force.

As I understand it, Al Quaeda in Iraq began life as 'Monotheism and Holy War' post-Mujahedeen, Islamist movement which operated in northern Iraq under the protection of 'no fly zones' established by the United States. This was run by a fellow named Zaquari (sic), who was an ideological rival and opponent of Osama Bin Laden.

This is an oversimplification, but part of their rivalry centred on their visions for the Islamic revolution. Osama believed in the 'far enemy.' Essentially, Bin Laden's notion was twofold. Local problems could be traced, in part, to the interference of foreign powers, particularly the United States. And secondly, by focusing on a far enemy, Islamic peoples could be united. Zaquari considered Bin Laden a lazy ass, rich boy, poser playing at war. His vision was grass roots. You had to go in and throw a thug out, like the Taliban had done.

Funny thing was, Bush II, actually avoided attacking Zaquari, since his continued presence in Iraq became part of the cassus belli for invasion. Can't very well use him to justify invasion if you've blown up his ass, can you?

It was well after the invasion and occupation that 'Monotheism and Holy War' converted and became 'Al Quaeda in Iraq.' Essentially what happened was that Zaquari found he really wasn't doing much business. There was Al Quaeda, making world class headlines every time you turned around - 9/11, Kobar Towers, the Cole, the Embassy Bombings, London Subways, Spanish Railways, Bali Nightclubs. What was Zaquari doing? A car bombing once in a while. It was embarrassing. His brand just couldn't compete. So he bought in.

'Al Quaeda in Iraq' was just Zaquari purchasing license rights for the Al Quaeda franchise. Name recognition, regional distributorship, stuff like that. Same people, same operations, no changes. The only thing was that Zaquari bought the right to trade on the name and reputation of Al Quaeda, and to share a bit in the glory of international operations.

Didn't change a goddammed thing on the ground.

So, what's Al Quaeda in Iraq amount to? Not much.

Before Petreaus came to power with his nearly superhuman fellatio skills, no one who paid attention considered them significant.

Al Quaeda in Iraq, has generally been estimated to be responsible for 3 to 5% of insurgent activity. It never really gained much in the way of traction or popularity with the Iraqi population, in part due to Zaquari's Jordanian roots.

Al Quaeda in Iraq found itself superseded by local grass roots movements based in towns and villages, in tribes and among clans. The development of insurgent movements appears to have been clearly an indigenous phenomenon. One of the problems that American forces had in dealing with the enemy was that there was no command and control structure to attack This lack of central or directional structure meant that Al Quaeda would not amount to more than a single force among many. It failed to thrive or garner a following. The result was that local jihadists or neo-baathist insurgents became more regionally viable.

There's no indication that the situation has changed radically since Petreaus took power. The more likely explanation is that Petreaus opinions and views come to him from the top down. ie, he says what the President wants to hear or wants him to say, rather than what actually is going on.

Petreaus obvious misjudgment/incompetence on this issue does not speak well of his stewarship. He seems to be yet another in a long line of American generals who are better at press conferences than fighting, better at talking about victories than accomplishing them.

If only they'd all wear uniforms and open a headquarters with a flag on top we would be able to figure out exactly who the enemy is. At least you'd know who to grovel and surrender to.

Ain't really much for grovelling or surrendering, but different strokes for different folks. If it floats your boat, you just go right ahead.

If only they'd wear uniforms and open a headquarters with a flag on top, we could use all that military superiority. If only the enemy would tattoo bulls-eyes on their ass cheeks and march at us backwards and bent over. Sadly, that's not the way it works.

Which is the beauty of the Al Quaeda brand. Any mujahadeen can buy in and gain credibility.

It' may be questionable as to whether Al Quaeda really exists in certain senses. It may simply have become a franchise operation by this time.

Both the Spanish Railway and the London Subway bombers seem to be Al Quaeda franchises. They don't seem to be connected directly with Bin Laden's operation, but are indigenous groups which adopt the names and some of the methods.

That said, both the Spanish Railway and London Subway groups were very good at mimicking Al Quaeda's signatures - multiple simultaneous attacks on high value/high traffic targets.

In comparison, the failure of Al Quaeda in Iraq to have any sort of impact is quite remarkable. If it wasn't for guys like Petraeus promoting the heck out of them for American Audiences, well, they'd be completely obscure.

Oh, I think the foreign fighters in Iraq have a greater impact than you do, though I do understand that they are used to stir up support here at home. Sixty to eighty jihadis a month is all they need to keep the suicide attacks on civilians going.

Just buy a franchise and you can cause any trouble you please and folks will say it's not really Al Qaeda.

10-15 a month is enough to make the news and allow the usual suspects to point to failure.

"Foreign fighters in Iraq have a greater impact than you do"? That didn't actually make any sort of sense. What were you trying to say?

As to the substantive impact of foreign fighters, best evidence is that they represent substantially less than 10% of the insurgency, and may actually represent as little as 1% or 2%, depending on how you slice them up. They seem to be disproportionately represented in suicide attacks, but then again, that only tells us that the vast majority of indigenous insurgents are in it for the long haul.

You're missing the point. How do you beat a franchise? Conventional military tactics oriented to command and control systems are useless, largely because those systems do not exist. Franchise operations exist in the business world, and have very different business and operational models than conventional corporations. It might be in our interest to understand what we're up against.

Of course, maybe the 'talking a lot of trash and then floundering like a drunk drowning in a bathtub' model that America's got going in Iraq will work out. Let's keep doing that for a while longer and see what happens.

Point.

"Foreign fighters in Iraq have a greater impact than you (think they) do"?

That makes a lot more sense.

But that raises issues of its own. There are definitely a small number of foreign fighters in Iraq. On the other hand, except for suicide bombers, they don't have much impact.

There was an interesting article a couple of years back about these Saudi Arabian kids who got all hopped up on Jihad fever and decided to go to Iraq to fight the infidels. They got a great welcome from the local Iraqi's. They were fed and celebrated. Then they got taken out back and shown some cars. "Which car bomb would you like to drive?" they were asked. Apparently, the local Iraqi's treated foreign fighters like spare parts or ammunition, they were there to drive the suicide bombs. Well, the Saudi kids thought it over a bit. Then they snuck back to Saudi Arabia. Interesting story, and it tells us a bit about what might be going on.

One thing we have to keep in mind is that foreign fighters are not necessarily Al Quaeda. Indeed, most foreign fighters are not Al Quaeda. They're just mostly guys who get all hopped up and idealistic, head out, and then fall in with someone who outfits them with a vest or car.

Inspiring post, tobetterdays. Im 4 months in from my breakup, and even though I was the dumpER, I still have rough days and think about her more than I probably should a big part is because people STILL mention her to me/ask if Ive heard from her. But it was for the best, and I still believe that to be true.

Welcome.

Didn't catch 2better's post. My bad.

'For the best' is always debatable. For whom? and all that jazz.

Still, what is is.