I would like to have a discussion about the geopolitical reality of the Middle East, and how the City of London and Anglo-American Establishment are playing dice with the world at large.



America, Iran, and Operation Ajax: The Burden of the Past
by Steven LaTulippe

The news has been abuzz recently with stories about President Bush’s alleged plans for "regime change" in Iran. Just last week, rumors were reported of US Air Force fighters violating Iranian air space for the purposes of testing their air defense system. As the nuclear crisis continues to simmer, the next incursions may be of a more belligerent nature.

Obviously, America’s relationship with Iran has been extremely hostile over the past several decades. From the perspective of most Americans, the seminal event of US-Iranian relations was the siege of the US embassy in Tehran and the subsequent holding of its staff as hostages back in the 1970s.

Although that hostage-taking was brutal and unjustified, many Americans lack a more global perspective of the history of American interactions with Persia. One of the most critical events in that relationship occurred over 50 years ago during the Eisenhower Administration. While Americans may know little about Operation Ajax, its memory still evokes intense anger from nearly every Iranian.

The brief version (for a more thorough history of the events surrounding Operation Ajax, I refer the reader to Sandra Mackey’s excellent book The Iranians) concerns the overthrow of Muhammad Mossadeq’s short-lived, democratic government by the CIA in 1953 and the reinstallation of the Shah to the throne of Iran.

In 1951, the control of Iran’s oil fields by a British company (the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, or AIOC) became a hot political topic. The Iranian people believed, with some justification, that the existing deal between the Iranian government and AIOC unfairly benefited the company. Muhammad Mossadeq, then a member of the Iranian parliament, took the lead in demanding a renegotiation of the pact. The masses of the Iranian people rallied to his standard and quickly made him the most revered leader in the land. The Shah, who then ruled as an authoritarian monarch, lost control of events as his previously powerless parliament (the Majlis) took on a life of its own.

As Mackay notes:

With Mossadeq leading the charge against Iran’s economic master, the Majlis, on March 15, boldly nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company…On April 29, the same Majlis elected Muhammad Mossadeq prime minister. While the shah sat on the throne as a mere shadow, Muhammad Mossadeq basked in the acclaim of the vast majority of Iranians, who for the first time in decades gave their genuine respect, devotion, and loyalty to their recognized leader.

While I certainly don’t condone his socialistic tendencies or his seizure of the oilfields, it is undeniable that by the time of his elevation to prime minister, Mossadeq had the backing of the overwhelming majority of the Iranian population. For the first time in its long history, Iran had a democratically elected leader.

By 1953, Mossadeq was in an increasingly difficult situation. Oil revenues had plummeted due to a boycott of Iranian oil and the economy slumped. The Soviet-backed Iranian communist party was becoming increasingly aggressive, and Washington began to worry. Iran was a vital chess piece in the Cold War and the American oil companies had their eyes on future concessions there. Mossadeq had become an "issue" for some very powerful people.

Eventually, the decision was made in Washington that Mossadeq had to go. Brigadier General Norman Schwarzkopf (father of the Gulf War commander) and CIA guru Kermit Roosevelt (grandson of Teddy) were ordered to begin a covert operation designed to remove Mossadeq and restore the Shah to absolute authority. A complex plot, codenamed Operation Ajax, was conceived and executed from the US Embassy in Tehran.

Using CIA assets in the Iranian military and various minor political parties, an uprising was staged.

Mackey describes the climax:

For nine hours, the pro-shah army, utilizing American-style military strategy and logistics, battled pro-Mossadeq demonstrators. At least 300 people died. By nightfall, the Mossadeq partisans had drawn into a tight cordon around the premier’s palace. Inside, the aged and always ailing prime minister threw a coat over his pajamas, leaped over the garden wall, and went into hiding. Forty-eight hours later he was arrested. The brief euphoric moment when the followers of Mossadeq believed that he held Iran’s destiny in his hands evaporated.

The Shah, who had fled to Rome at the first whiff of gunpowder, rode back to power on the tip of American bayonets.

In essence, the United States had engaged in a massive covert operation designed to remove a democratically elected leader from power and reinstall an authoritarian monarch (a move which makes a mockery of our currently stated desire to "spread democracy" in the Middle East).

This affair had several disastrous ramifications for the future of American-Iranian relations. First, the Shah, from that point forward, was viewed as a creature of America. Consequently, America became an accessory to his every oppressive act during the subsequent 26 years of his rule. Second, the American embassy in Tehran was permanently marked as a "nest of spies" in the eyes of the Iranian populace. And third, Iranian democracy was strangled in its crib.

The next time the populace rose to overthrow the Shah (in the 1970s), they viewed America as their enemy and were cheering a leader who was significantly less democratic than Mossadeq. When rumors began circulating that the Americans were going to bring the Shah back via yet another covert operation, the Iranian mobs responded by seizing the US embassy in Tehran and holding its workers hostage.

If Mossadeq’s regime had been permitted to continue, it is entirely possible that Iran could have evolved into an authentic democracy. American interventionism destroyed that opportunity and set the stage for many of the tragedies currently haunting the Middle East.

If America is ever to have even remotely cordial relations with Iran, we must accept responsibility for the terrible effects of Operation Ajax and admit that we had no right to intervene in a controversy that was wholly the business of the Iranian people. That exploit was unworthy of the Land of Washington and Jefferson.

While the American public often quickly forgets the interventions and mischievous actions of its government, our overseas victims seldom do. The current climate of international terrorism should prompt the American people to take a more active interest, since these transgressions often come back to haunt us in the most unexpected ways.

January 18, 2005

Steven LaTulippe is a physician currently practicing in Ohio. He was an officer in the United States Air Force for 13 years.

Copyright © 2005 LewRockwell.com
http://www.lewrockwell.com/latulippe/latulippe41.html

Yes indeedy.

I love short form history. Thanks.

Steven has some other interesting writings. Look around Lew Rockwell, Antiwar.com, informationclearinghouse. Predicted Kerry would win though.

Which he may have done by winning Ohio...

Same as Nixon in Illinois or Gore in Fla. Ifs and buts.

Little off topic guys...

Just kidding...

The Secret CIA History of the Iran Coup - U.S. National Security Archives

On the topic, it's interesting enough to go back to the 50s and try to blame the US, but everything builds on something else. The cold war came from WWII, and now that's given way to various worldwide Islamist problems.

Mossadeq's oil nationalization sure is reminiscent of Hugo Chavez.

While it's true interventions can come back and bite us, lack of intervention can bite us as well.

Huh?

We wouldn't let a PRC-government backed or controlled company buy Unocal, and you're whining that Mossadeq nationalized Iran's oil?

Just who the fark are the U.S. and the U.K. to determine who should own and control country's energy resources?

Chavez and Venezuela probably will find out that nationalizing one's oil and natural gas resources is not a terribly good idea. But, they shouldn't have to find out through military intervention or a CIA-manufactured and financed coup. Between the rights of multinational oil-companies and the rights of citizens of other countries to make mistakes, I support the latter, hands down.

So, if other countries are financing coups, backing dictators, rigging elections, fomenting rebellions and doing whatever they can to attack us, what exactly do we do? If citizens of other countries were all making mistakes based on total freedom from outside intervention I'd agree with you completely. But it doesn't work that way.

http://www.iranchamber.com/history/coup53/coup53p1.php


Dr. Mosaddeq, a European-educated lawyer then in his early 70's, prone to tears and outbursts, refused to back down. In meetings in November and December 1952, the secret history says, British intelligence officials startled their American counterparts with a plan for a joint operation to oust the nettlesome prime minister.

The Americans, who "had not intended to discuss this question at all," agreed to study it, the secret history says. It had attractions. Anti-Communism had risen to a fever pitch in Washington, and officials were worried that Iran might fall under the sway of the Soviet Union, a historical presence there.

In March 1953, an unexpected development pushed the plot forward: the CIA's Tehran station reported that an Iranian general had approached the American Embassy about supporting an army-led coup.

The newly inaugurated Eisenhower administration was intrigued. The coalition that elected Dr. Mosaddeq was splintering, and the Iranian Communist Party, the Tudeh, had become active.

Allen W. Dulles, the director of central intelligence, approved $1 million on April 4 to be used "in any way that would bring about the fall of Mosaddeq," the history says.

"The aim was to bring to power a government which would reach an equitable oil settlement, enabling Iran to become economically sound and financially solvent, and which would vigorously prosecute the dangerously strong Communist Party."

Does the US have any national oil companies? Have we nationalized anyone else's businesses? I'm reticent to make too many comparisons, but generally when governments start nationalizing things it isn't a sign of good things to come. The idea that we worked to install a friendly regime in Iran just doesn't bother me that much.



Somehow cold war context always gets left out of attacks on the CIA or US foreign policy of the time.

I had a pet pig named Ajax.

I know.

The 'cold war context' is always already available for the CIA and U.S. foreign policy. There's always a 'danger' lurking, an imminent danger, etc.

The Communist Party in Iran (and Iraq) was not clandestine. It was a regular political party. It had the audacity to organize among workers, small employers and farmers (I know, it doesn't seem right) and peasants. We certainly couldn't have THAT!

They had CPs all over the world. The thing was they were often financed by the KGB (like Gus Hall getting a million a year), and were likely to do exactly what you decry the CIA for doing. Getting involved in coups to create states friendly to their views, if not outright puppets.

In regards to Ajax, Mossadegh originally wanted 20% of the oil revenues for Iran, so he could embark on modernizing Iran's infrastructure. The AIOC originally had contracts giving Iran ONLY 1-3% of the oil revenues.

MI6/CIA went into Iran with hundreds of millions of dollars; the whole coup was done with under 20 people, around 10 MI6 agents and 10 CIA agents. This was done through staging false-flag terror events in Iran and bombing Mosques. Also, they printed up flyers which said and I'm paraphrasing: " down with Mossedegh, down with Communism, up with Allah." These flyers were distributed throughout the country and people bought into the propaganda.

Mossadegh also kicked the Communists out of Iran.

Another part of the coup was bringing the Mullahs back into the fold. Basically, if you read Kermit Roosevelt's after action reports, they convinced the Mullahs that democracy was anti-Islamic.

For further reading, I would recommend CounterCoup by Kermit Roosevelt Jr.

I'm more than willing to do some counter-reading. Defending the CIA before my birth is hardly a priority of mine, but often I do find things that get posted to prove a point have some context lacking.

So often all the choices are bad, but a particular author only points to certain bad choices and outcomes. I'm sure had we all taken out Hitler in 38 somebody would be complaining about whatever bad things transpired from that.

I am only 30, so it was before my time too.

Also, check out some of the research by Anthony J. Sutton. It is very well documented and voluminous.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antony_C._Sutton

I'll check that out. Back in the days when we were buddies with the Shah Iran tried to hire my dad and some missile experts from the US to keep his weapons systems working. I remember something about one quitting because they were getting close to his price.

The mideast is full of nasty people that rule by force because otherwise they'd be dead. Few retire peacefully.

Here is what I would like.

I would like you to admit that the people whose internal affairs in which we, the US, interfere have every reason and right to be upset about it, and hold grudges.

Do you have any concrete data on this particular case? Do you know anything specifically about the Iran CP, its relations with Mossadegh, etc.?

Not all CPs were alike, and the U.S.S.R. was not always supporting violent overthrows of duly elected governments to install Communist ones.

It's all fine and good to sit here in the U.S. and talk about 'necessary casualties' etc. as a result of the grand-fight between the USSR and the US and their respective allies and satelites during the Cold War. On the other hand, the people who got forqued over in the various countries by the local lackeys of the two gorillas for doing not much at all (e.g. for being related to one who had been 'active' with the 'wrong' side) don't have that luxury. When their countries had to be ruled with two parallel legal systems, one for 'right-thinking Xians' and one for the "wrong-thinking Xians", when the police and gendarmerie would operate with impunity just as long as they could claim 'national security' and the struggle against 'the Imperialists' or 'the Communists', they were bound to develop a different perspective.